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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from a final order (Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment) of the Third Judicial District Court of and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah (Honorable L.A. Dever). Richard G. Fordham, the 
plaintiff-appellant, appealed to this Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0). This Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(4), transferred this Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. After that court 
affirmed the District Court order of summary judgment, Mr. Fordham petitioned 
for a writ of certiorari. This Court granted that petition as to the following issue: 
"Whether the court of appeals correctly adopted the 'professional rescuer 
doctrine' and correctly delineated the rationales supporting it and its scope of 
application." This Court now also has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(a). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the 
professional rescuer doctrine prohibits Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim 
against defendant-appellee Ryan Oldroyd and in, accordingly, affirming the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment to Mr. Oldroyd. 
1 
(Standard of Review) 
Summary judgment should be affirmed only if there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact and only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions 
for correctness. E.g., Andreini v. Hultqren. 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993). 
The appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling on appeal of a 
grant of summary judgment. E.g., Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 
588 (Utah App. 1993). On review of a grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. This Court accords no 
deference to the Court of Appeals' legal analysis. 
(Issue Preserved in District Court and Court of Appeals) 
This issue was preserved in the district court by Mr. Fordham's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
88-126) and by his counsel's oral argument, presented on March 16, 2005, in 
opposition to that Motion. This issue formed the basis for this Appeal and was 
addressed in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and Reply Brief submitted to the 
Court of Appeals. 
B. Whether this Court should correct the Court of Appeals' erroneous 
and problematic analyses regarding duty and causation. 
2 
(Standard of Review) 
This Court accords no deference to the Court of Appeals' legal analysis. 
(Preservation of Issue) 
Because the questions of duty and causation were never specifically at 
issue in the District Court proceedings, Mr. Fordham can point to no specific 
instance of preservation. He refers the Court to the Statement of Facts 
appearing below at pp. 5-8. The Court of Appeals sua sponte included 
discussions of "The Element of Duty" (ffif 19-22) and "The Element of 
Causation" (fflj 23-27) in its opinion. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF 
APPEALS 
This Appeal, in this case that stems from an incident in which 
Mr. Fordham, a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, was severely injured, is from the 
District Court's order granting Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment 
entered pursuant to the District Court's determination that the professional 
rescuer doctrine, or "Fireman's Rule," prohibits Mr. Fordham from prevailing in 
this litigation. 
Mr. Fordham alleged, in his Complaint (R. 1-4), that Mr. Oldroyd was 
negligent in connection with the subject incident of December 28, 2003 and 
3 
that, as a proximate cause of Mr. Oldroyd's alleged negligence, Mr. Fordham 
has sustained substantial compensable damages. Mr. Oldroyd in his Answer 
(R. 7-12) denied those allegations. After limited discovery, including the taking 
of the depositions of Mr. Oldroyd and Mr. Fordham, Mr. Oldroyd filed his 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 39-40) and his Memorandum in support of 
that Motion (R. 41-87). Mr. Fordham submitted his Memorandum in opposition 
to that Motion (R. 88-126), along with a Request for Hearing and Oral 
Argument (R. 127-28). Mr. Oldroyd then submitted his Reply Memorandum in 
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 129-46). 
Oral argument was held on Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on March 16, 2005. At the conclusion of the hearing on 
Mr. Oldroyd's Motion, the District Court, announcing its determination that the 
Fireman's Rule prohibits Mr. Fordham from maintaining this action against 
Mr. Oldroyd for injuries sustained when Mr. Fordham was struck by another 
driver while he was at the scene of a rollover accident caused by Mr. Oldroyd's 
negligence, from the bench orally granted Mr. Oldroyd's Motion. That ruling 
was formalized by the District Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 163-64; a copy of that Order appears in the 
Addendum hereto at 01-02). 
4 
This Appeal ensued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of 
Summary Judgment. A copy of its opinion is set forth in the Addendum hereto 
at 03-15. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 28, 2003, on the (eastbound) 600 South off-ramp 
from 1-15, in Salt Lake City, Mr. Oldroyd allegedly operated a motor vehicle 
negligently and in violation of his duty of care. R. 2; 41-42. 
2. Among other things, Mr. Oldroyd was allegedly driving too fast for 
existing conditions (the roadway surface was snowy and/or icy), failed to 
operate the vehicle he was operating within a single lane, and failed to keep 
that vehicle under control. R. 2; 41-42. As alleged proximate results of 
Mr. Oldroyd's subject negligence, Mr. Oldroyd lost control of his vehicle, that 
vehicle traveled across the traffic lanes to its left, struck a snow bank on the 
left (north) side of the roadway, overturned onto its top, and blocked the 
northern-most off-ramp travel lane. R. 2. 
3. As alleged further proximate results of Mr. Oldroyd's subject 
negligence, Mr. Fordham, who had been called to the scene, stopped his 
Highway Patrol vehicle for traffic control and highway safety purposes, in the 
immediate vicinity of the vehicle that Mr. Oldroyd had been operating, and was 
in the process of getting flares out of the trunk of his vehicle when another 
5 
person operating another vehicle on the same off-ramp encountered ice and/or 
snow on the roadway and lost control of that vehicle, and that vehicle struck 
Mr. Fordham. R. 2-3; 42. 
4. As alleged further proximate results of Mr. Oldroyd's alleged 
subject negligence, Mr. Fordham has sustained severe bodily injuries, 
including a leg injury that nearly resulted in amputation; has sustained 
substantial lost income and earning capacity; has sustained substantial 
impairment and disability; has experienced substantial physical and emotional 
pain and suffering; has sustained substantial disfigurement; has sustained 
substantial loss of, and diminution of, enjoyment of various life activities; has 
incurred substantial health care expenses; has sustained a substantial loss of 
his pre-incident ability to provide household services; has sustained and 
incurred additional "special" and "general" damages; and will, in the future, 
sustain and incur substantial additional such damages, all to his damage in 
compensable and reasonable amounts to be determined by the jury herein. 
R. 3. 
5. Prior to filing this action, Mr. Fordham settled with the driver of the 
vehicle that struck him for her liability insurance policy limits of $50,000. 
6. Mr. Fordham was also eligible for, and has received, workers 
compensation benefits. 
6 
7. Mr. Oldroyd has acknowledged that, as he came down the hill 
from the off-ramp, he encountered "black ice," lost control momentarily, then 
regained control, then lost control again, then slid, fishtailing across other 
lanes of traffic, and his car then hit a snow bank piled up against the barrier on 
the left (north) side of the road and flipped over. R. 156-57. 
8. Mr. Oldroyd saw the other vehicle striking Mr. Fordham. R. 158. 
9. It appeared to Mr. Oldroyd that the experience that the driver of 
the vehicle that struck Mr. Fordham had with the roadway was not exactly like 
his but similar to his, and he believes that the other driver encountered the 
same problem on the roadway that he had encountered and that the other 
driver's experience occurred within about one-half hour of the time that his 
own rollover incident had occurred. R. 158-59. 
10. Mr. Oldroyd saw approximately five cars slipping or sliding on the 
roadway between the time of his rollover incident and the time the driver 
whose vehicle struck Mr. Fordham came along, and those cars seemed to 
have about the same kind of initial reaction that his car had had at about the 
same spots on the roadway. R. 159-60. 
11. Those other drivers were able to regain control of their vehicles 
without coming clear across the roadway and striking the snow bank on the left 
side and were able to regain control of their vehicles and keep going down the 
7 
hill, and there was a mix of SUVs and passenger cars among those vehicles. 
R. 160. 
12. Mr. Oldroyd had encountered black ice and slush in his previous 
driving experience and knew from his driving experience that, if one 
encountered black ice or slush, there was a potential for one's losing control 
and sliding and perhaps striking a snow bank and perhaps overturning and 
perhaps losing control and hitting other vehicles or persons in the way. R. 
160-61. 
13. It is Mr. Oldroyd's understanding that Mr. Fordham was among 
the officers who arrived at the scene to investigate and assist with 
Mr. Oldroyd's accident. R. 163. 
14. Mr. Oldroyd knew prior to the time of the subject incident that, if 
he should lose control and get into an accident himself (a rollover or some 
other kind), officers of the law would be coming to investigate and assist. R. 
162. 
15. It was not Mr. Oldroyd but someone else (an occupant of a vehicle 
that was already at the scene) who made the "911" call. R. 62-63. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals erroneously adopted the professional rescuer 
doctrine, erroneously applied that doctrine to Mr. Fordham's claim, and 
8 
erroneously affirmed the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment to 
Mr. Oldroyd. 
The sole basis for Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
sole basis for the District Court's granting that Motion was the professional 
rescuer doctrine, a common-law doctrine that, where accepted and applied to 
facts such as those pertinent to this case, works to prohibit injured public 
safety officers from prevailing in personal injury actions against those whose 
negligence causes them to be, in the exercise of their job duties, at the scene 
of incidents in which they are injured. The professional rescuer doctrine has 
been accepted, to varying degrees and in various forms, by the courts of many 
jurisdictions. It has also been rejected outright, or limited in its ambit, in ways 
that would not prohibit Mr. Fordham from prevailing on his claim against 
Mr. Oldroyd, by courts of other jurisdictions. 
This Court should rule that the professional rescuer doctrine is at odds 
with the Utah statutory scheme, unfairly discriminates against public safety 
officers; and should not be deemed to be part of the common law of the State 
of Utah. Alternatively, this Court should limit the ambit of the doctrine to its 
original reach -- insulating private landowners from liability to firemen and 
other "professional rescuers" who come to their property - and not apply it to 
situations like this one. 
9 
This Court should, in any event, reverse the Court of Appeals and 
remand this case for trial. 
This Court should also correct parts of the Court of Appeals opinion 
(dealing with duty and causation) that might otherwise cause considerable 
confusion in Utah tort law. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADOPTING THE 
PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE AND IN 
DETERMINING THAT THAT DOCTRINE PROHIBITS 
MR. FORDHAM FROM PURSUING HIS CLAIMS AGAINST 
MR.OLDROYD. 
The "Fireman's Rule" is a widely rule recognized which, where it is 
followed, prevents firefighters and police officers injured in the course of 
their duties from recovering from those whose negligence proximately 
caused their injuries or from the owner or occupant of premises who is 
responsible for creating the condition requiring their presence on the 
property. The Fireman's Rule has been applied to preclude recovery 
against negligent motorists for injuries sustained by police officers which 
were reasonably foreseeable in the course of their duties on the 
highway. The rule is applicable where a police officer is responding to 
or investigating an automobile accident and where an officer is injured 
as a result of a motorist's actions in negligently stopping on a highway. 
Am.Jur.2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic §691 (emphasis added). R. 43 
(Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this case "presents a difficult 
issue with cogent arguments supporting both the rejection and the adoption of 
the professional-rescuer doctrine in this state" fl[ 8 of Court of Appeals opinion) 
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and that "it is a close question and Fordham raises valid considerations" fl| 13 
of Court of Appeals opinion). 
The Court of Appeals opinion states, at fl 8: 
This case presents the first opportunity for any Utah appellate court to 
consider whether, under Utah law, the professional-rescuer doctrine 
operates to bar a police officer's claim for injuries against a driver, 
whose alleged negligence caused the officer to be at the scene of an 
accident, but where the officer's injuries were inflicted by the alleged 
negligence of a third party. 
After noting, in U 10 of its opinion, that the professional rescuer doctrine 
"has been adopted by the vast majority of jurisdictions that have considered it," 
the Court of Appeals went on to explain, in If 11, that that doctrine has been 
rejected by some jurisdictions and limited in its application by others. As 
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, at fl 12, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court, in Minnich v. Med-Waste. Inc., 564 S.E.2d 98,103 (S.C. 2002), 
resolved the issue as follows: 
In our view, the tort law of this state adequately addresses negligence 
claims brought against non-employer tortfeasors arising out of injuries 
incurred by firefighters and police officers during the discharge of their 
duties. We are not persuaded by any of the various rationales 
advanced by those courts that recognize the firefighter's rule. The more 
sound public policy -- and the one we adopt -- is to decline to 




The professional rescuer doctrine was the sole basis for Mr. Oldroyd's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the sole basis on which the District Court 
granted that Motion. 
Given the similarities between Mr. Oldroyd's driving conduct and losing 
control of his vehicle and the conduct and losing control of her vehicle of the 
driver who struck Mr. Fordham, given such things as the short passage of time 
between Mr. Oldroyd's conduct and that of the other driver, and given 
Mr. Oldroyd's own acknowledgments (see Facts numbered 7-14, set forth at 
pp. 7-8 above), there is, at a minimum, a question of fact as to whether 
Mr. Oldroyd's alleged negligence, was a proximate cause1 of Mr. Fordham's 
injuries and damages. Mr. Oldroyd apparently acknowledges the correctness 
of that proposition, or else he would be expected to have contested it in his 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
163-64), prepared by Mr. Oldroyd's counsel, states, in part: 
Plaintiff, as a highway patrol trooper, acting in the course and scope of 
his employment, cannot maintain a cause of action against Defendant 
for injuries sustained when he was struck by another driver while at the 
scene of a rollover accident caused by Defendant's negligence. 
1
 At TJ 5 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated, erroneously and perhaps 
tellingly, that Mr. Fordham asserted that Mr. Oldroyd's alleged negligence was 
the proximate case of Mr. Fordham's injuries. Mr. Fordham did not allege, and 
has never contended, that Mr. Oldroyd's negligence was the sole proximate 
cause of his injuries. 
12 
(Emphasis added.) 
As with the question of Mr. Oldroyd's negligence, there is, at a minimum, 
a triable question of fact as to the proximate cause connection between 
Mr. Oldroyd's negligence and the injuries and damages sustained by 
Mr. Fordham. Utah law is clear that an intervening negligent act (Mr. Fordham 
does not dispute the proposition that the driver who struck him was negligent) 
is not necessarily a superseding cause that relieves an original actor such as 
Mr. Oldroyd of liability. This Court has clearly held, in Godeskv v. Provo City 
Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 1984): 
The earlier actor is charged with the foreseeable negligent acts of 
others. Therefore, if the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the 
earlier negligent act is a concurring [not superseding] cause. 
See, also, MUJI 3.16, and other cases there cited. It is also a matter of clearly 
established Utah law that the negligence of two or more persons may combine 
to produce an injury and that the negligence of two or more persons may be 
proximate causes of the same injury, in which case the negligent persons must 
share liability, for the subject injuries and damages, in proportion to their 
individual percentages of negligence. See, e.g., MUJI 3.15 and cases there 
cited. 
It thus appears clear that, unless the Court of Appeals' determination 
that the professional rescuer doctrine prohibits Mr. Fordham from maintaining 
13 
this action against Mr. Oldroyd is affirmed, Mr. Fordham should be allowed to 
present his claim against Mr. Oldroyd to a jury, and that the jury should be 
allowed to determine the respective percentages of causal fault of Mr. Oldroyd 
and the driver whose vehicle struck Mr. Fordham, as well as the amounts of 
Mr. Fordham's compensable damages. 
One of the underpinnings of some cases relied on by Mr. Oldroyd in the 
District Court proceedings is the notion that firefighters and police officers 
"assume the risk" of injuries in connection with their employment.2 It is well-
established, however, that, in Utah, assumption of risk is not an absolute 
defense. E.g., Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.. 631 P.2d 865, 868-
72 (Utah 1981). Furthermore, the basic philosophy of Utah tort law and the 
Liability Reform Act of 1986, codified at Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to -43, is 
that each tortfeasor must pay his, her, or its fair share of a plaintiffs damages. 
The Utah Legislature has made no exception to that rule of law for public 
safety officers, and there is no good reason for this Court to adopt a common 
law exception to that rule. 
2
 The District Court's Order from which this Appeal is taken concludes with this 
language: 
The Court finds that the type of risk which resulted in injury to 
[Mr. Fordham] is precisely the type of risk [Mr. Fordham] was hired to 
confront as a highway patrol trooper, and the "Fireman's Rule" therefore 
precludes [Mr. Fordham's] claim of negligence against [Mr. Oldroyd]. 
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The Court of Appeals observed, in n. 1 of its opinion, (1) that 
Mr. Fordham had collected policy limits ($50,000) from the insurance carrier of 
the motorist whose vehicle struck him; and (2) that Mr. Fordham has received 
workers compensation benefits. That first fact is of no particular significance. 
With respect to that second fact, the Utah Legislature has determined that it is 
permissible for one who receives workers compensation benefits to also 
pursue a tort claim or claims against the person or persons whose negligence 
has proximately caused the injured employee's injuries and damages. Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-106 provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable 
under this [workers compensation] chapter... is caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an employer, 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer: 
(b) the injured employee or the employee's heirs or personal 
representative may have an action for damages against the 
third person. 
(Emphasis added.) There is no exception for fire or police officers injured in 
the line of duty, and this Court should not leave standing a decision that 
singles out firefighters and public safety officers, from the universe of private 
and other public actors, for discriminatory treatment. 
15 
Furthermore, the basic philosophy of Utah tort law ana tne Liaomty 
Reform Act of 1986, codified at Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to -43, is that 
each tortfeasor must pay his, her, or its fair share of a plaintiffs damages. The 
Utah Legislature has made no exception to that rule of law for public safety 
officers, and this Court should not leave standing a decision that adopts a 
common law exception to that rule. 
Cases from various jurisdictions have rejected the Fireman's Rule 
outright or declined to apply it to situations like this. For example, in 
Christensen v. Murphy. 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 1984) (cited atf l 11 of the Court of 
Appeals Opinion), the Oregon Supreme Court, in the course of reversing a 
judgment in favor of the defendant, stated, after first explaining that the basis 
for the professional rescuer doctrine had to do with assumption of risk: 
Implied assumption of risk in both primary and secondary forms 
statutorily has been abolished in this state since 1975, and thus it can 
no longer serve as an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery. [Citations 
omitted.] That fact requires us to reexamine the "fireman's rule" to 
determine whether we can still hold that a fire fighter or police officer 
assumes the risk of another's negligence to the point of absolutely 
barring a public safety officer from recovering in a negligence action. 
When we thus reexamine the "fireman's rule," we find that its major 
theoretical underpinning is gone. Therefore, because the rule is not 
sustainable under implied assumption of risk analysis, we must 
determine if any other supportable theory under the general rubric of 
"policy" will provide the foundation for the rule. The most often cited 
policy considerations include: 1) To avoid placing too heavy a burden 
16 
on premises owners to keep their premises safe from unpredictable 
entrance of firefighters; 2) To spread the risk of the fire fighters' injuries 
to the public through workers' compensation, salary and fringe benefits; 
3) To encourage the public to call for professional help and not rely on 
self-help in emergency situations; 4) To avoid increased litigation.... 
[Citations omitted.] 
Frequently, the so-called policy reasons are merely redraped arguments 
drawn from premises liability or implied assumption of risk, neither of 
which are now available as legal foundations in this state. For example, 
policy consideration " 1 " above focuses on the fire fighter as a class from 
whom the premises owner needs immunity (akin to a licensee or 
trespasser), not on the reasonableness of the activity of the premises 
owner in the circumstances.... 
The remaining policy arguments are equally flawed. The weakness in 
the loss-spreading rationale, "2" above, is obvious. By denying a public 
safety officer recovery from a negligent tortfeasor, the officer is not 
directed to recover his damages from the general public; rather the 
officer is totally precluded from recovering these damages from anyone. 
Contrast this with other public employees who are injured when 
confronting dangers on their jobs. The latter can recover workers' 
compensation and salary benefits from the public, but are also allowed 
additional tort damages from the third-party tort-feasors. Under the 
"fireman's rule" the injured public safety officer must bear a loss which 
other public employees are not reguire to bear.... 
As for "3" above, Dean Prosser criticized as "preposterous rubbish" the 
argument offered to defend the "fireman's rule" that tort liability might 
deter landowners from uttering cries of distress in emergency situations. 
[Citations omitted.] We agree. Furthermore we have previously 
rejected "4" above, avoidance of increased litigation, as a ground for 
denying substantive liability. [Citations omitted.] 
As a result of statutory abolition of implied assumption of risk, we hold 
that the "fireman's rule" is abolished in Oregon as a rule of law and no 
longer can bar recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained by a 
public safety officer, in the course of his or her employment, as a result 
of a defendant's negligent conduct. 
17 
Id. at 1216-18 (emphasis added). 
In Banyai v. Arruda. 799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990), the Colorado 
Court of Appeals, in the course of reversing the dismissal of a police officer's 
claim against a driver whose negligence caused a collision and caused the 
officer to be present at the scene, where the officer's vehicle was rearended by 
other drivers, explained: 
We do not view employment as a firefighter or police officer as legal 
acceptance of the negligence of others who expose the officer to injury 
in connection with an automobile accident. This is especially so when 
consideration is given to the fact that other public employees, like 
citizens in general, remain entitled to assert their claims. 
While the officer's special skills, training, and experience may be 
considered with reference to any comparative negligence involved, in 
our view, a per se grant of immunity to those whose negligence creates 
a dangerous situation for the officer is an unwarranted departure from 
the general duty imposed to exercise due care for the safety of others. 
[Citation omitted.] Thus, we hold that a duty existed in this case for the 
drivers to exercise due care towards Banyai consistent with the law of 
negligence as applied in this state. 
Id. at 443 (emphasis added). 
See, also, the wise and eloquent analysis of the court in Minnich v. Med-
Waste. Inc.. 564 S.E.2d 98, 103 (S.C. 2002), quoted by the Court of Appeals 
and appearing at p. 11, above. 
Courts of other states have declined to apply the professional rescuer 
doctrine to situations other than those that originally gave rise to the rule 
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(those in which injured firemen sought to obtain tort recovery from those to 
whose premises they were summoned in emergency situations and 
subsequently injured). In Lave v. Neumann, 317 N.W.2d 779 (Neb. 1982) 
(cited at ^ 11 of the Court of Appeals opinion), the plaintiff, a policeman, was 
injured when he ran after a truck that had started moving after having been 
negligently left on the street by the defendant. The Nebraska Supreme Court 
held, in the course of affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff: 
The reasons which justify the application of the fireman's rule in cases 
where firemen were injured in fires involving personal property are the 
same reasons which support the rule in fires involving real property. A 
similar analogy cannot be made as to policemen injured while 
performing their duty not on private premises. 
We see no reason why, under the facts of this case, a policeman injured 
in the performance of his duty, by the negligence of another, has any 
less right to be compensated for his injuries than a person not a 
policeman. 
Id. at 782 (emphasis added). 
In Levandoski v. Cone, 841 A.2d 208 (Conn. 2004) (also cited at fl 11 of 
the Court of Appeals opinion), the Connecticut Supreme Court held, in the 
course of affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff: 
The common-law "firefighter's rule" provides, in general terms, that a 
firefighter or police officer who enters private property in the exercise of 
his duties occupies the status of a licensee and, therefore, is owed a 
duty of care by the property owner that is less than that owed to an 
ordinary invitee. [Citations omitted.] Thus, under the firefighter's rule, 
19 
the landowner generally owes the firefighter or police officer injured on 
his property "only the duty not to injure him willfully or wantonly ...." The 
principle issue in this appeal is whether the firefighter's rule should be 
extended beyond the scope of premises liability so as to bar a police 
officer from recovering, based on a claim of ordinary negligence, from a 
tortfeasor who is neither an owner nor a person in control of the 
premises. The defendant, who is not a landowner or a person in control 
of land, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a jury trial, 
in favor of the plaintiff, a police officer who was injured by the 
defendant's negligent conduct on the land of another person. We 
conclude that the firefighter's rule should not be so extended and, 
accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Fordham was injured when he was struck by a vehicle on a public 
highway and not while he was fighting a fire or responding to a fire or other 
incident on Mr. Oldroyd's property. The hoariest basis for invocation of the 
professional rescuer doctrine is thus clearly lacking in this case. 
It may also be worth noting that the jurisdictions that apply the 
professional rescuer doctrine implicitly or expressly make a distinction 
between those whose negligence creates the situation to which fire or police 
officers respond and those whose negligence (like that of the driver who struck 
Mr. Fordham) is the more immediate cause of harm.3 If the doctrine is 
consistently applied, based on its supposed policy underpinnings such as 
3
 The Court of Appeals expressly ruled, at fl 31 of its opinion, that the 
professional rescuer doctrine does not bar a public safety officer's claim 
against one whose negligence occurs after the officer arrives at the scene. 
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assumption of risk, the officers' working for all the taxpayers, and the 
proposition that workers compensation benefits are, in any event, available to 
public safety officers injured on the job, there should be no such distinction; 
and the doctrine should, if it is applied consistently, work to prohibit public 
safety officers from suing anyone for any injuries negligently inflicted on them 
in the course of their job duties. And yet no court seems to hew to the 
proposition that a police officer such as Mr. Fordham is unable to proceed 
against a person who (like the driver who struck Mr. Fordham) negligently 
injures him after he arrives at the scene to assist in a situation caused by an 
earlier negligent actor such as Mr. Oldroyd. This is so although, when one 
considers the concept of creation of risk and how broadly and in how many 
differing situations that concept is addressed in Utah tort law, there is no 
meaningful distinction between the risk created by someone who negligently 
sets up a potentially dangerous situation and the person whose negligence is 
the more immediate cause of the injury. A public safety officer risks his or her 
safety, as an inherent part of his or her job, is paid by the taxpayers, and may 
recover workers compensation benefits, regardless of whether he or she is 
injured by the person whose negligence occasions his or her presence, the 
negligence of the person whose vehicle strikes him or her, or a combination of 
both. 
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The professional rescuer doctrine did not prohibit Mr. Fordham from 
pursuing his claim against the driver who struck him even though one of the 
risks of his employment was that he might be struck by such a person. And 
yet the doctrine, as adopted and applied by the Court of Appeals, works to 
prohibit Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim against Mr. Oldroyd. That 
inconsistency appears to constitute another problem with the putative wisdom 
of the Rule. 
The author of Note: Has the Michigan Firefighter's Rule Gone up in 
Smoke? An Analysis of the Wilful and Wanton Exception. 44 Wayne L. Rev. 
1555, 1572-77 (Fall 1998), wrote: 
It is unjust to assign firefighters and police officers, officials who risk 
their lives to protect the public, to a status less than that of every other 
citizen. In essence, the courts are creating individualized duties of care 
based on occupational status, a practice that no Michigan court 
expressly condones. 
Further defects in the policy argument are seen in the inadequacy and 
harmful effects that can result from forcing police officers and firefighters 
to rely solely on workers' compensation. The courts have immunized 
tortfeasors from liability arising from their negligent misconduct by 
limiting safety officials to statutory recovery. This in turn fosters 
negligent behavior. People have no incentive to take proper precautions 
for fire prevention and criminals are afforded a greater degree of 
recklessness. While negligent citizens are being provided immunity, 
injured officers are being deprived adequate recovery as workers' 
compensation is generally inferior to a tort recovery. 
The notion that workers' compensation will best spread the cost of 
officers' injuries to the public as a whole is also a fallacy. Since 
taxpayers provide funds for the worker's compensation benefits that pay 
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injured officers, the system requires citizens who act non-negligently to 
pay for the misconduct of other citizens. The firefighter's rule forces the 
individual safety officer and the non-negligent citizen to unfairly shoulder 
this burden. Allowing safety officials to pursue third-party tort claims 
would alleviate this burden and would allow worker's compensation 
insurers the right of subrogation to any proceeds from a third-party 
award, reducing overall taxpayer expenses. 
The analysis is simple. Courts will merely apply general principles of 
negligence in determining whether recovery should be permitted to a 
particular public safety officer. Fundamental concepts of duty, breach, 
causation, and damages will determine liability instead of the current 
complicated and ambiguous exceptions. The trier of fact will consider 
whether "a defendant breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff," and 
whether that breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. Where a plaintiff fails to act reasonably under the 
circumstances, the general principles of comparative negligence will 
diminish the recovery. This system, grounded in familiar legal theories 
in which attorneys and courts are well-versed, will grant the greatest 
assurances of safety, cost prevention, efficiency and justice. Such a 
system will give firefighters and police officers a chance to recover the 
rights and privileges that a poorly conceived and poorly executed rule of 
law has stolen. 
This Court should determine that no public policy consideration relied on 
by the Court of Appeals is more important than the public policy consideration, 
recognized by the South Carolina Supreme in Minnich (quoted at p. 11, above) 
that fire and police officers (who risk their lives on a regular basis for a not 
particularly handsome salary) should not be subjected to discriminatory 
treatment. 
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B. THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT PARTS OF THE COURT 
OF APPEALS DECISION (DEALING WITH DUTY AND 
CAUSATION) THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE CAUSE 
CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION IN UTAH TORT LAW. 
The Court of Appeals sua sponte (Mr. Oldroyd made no such argument) 
concluded, on the purported basis of Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 
263, a decision of this Court that deals with the "open and obvious" doctrine of 
premises liability law, that "the doctrine of assumption of risk is a duty-defining 
role under the facts of this case." Court of Appeals opinion at ^ 22. The Court 
of Appeals so concluded in the face of this Court's clear pronouncement in 
Hale, at ffij 21-23 (116 P.3d at 268), that assumption of risk is an affirmative 
defense and not something that is subject to a duty-defining analysis. 
Mr. Fordham acknowledges that where there is no duty there can be no 
breach of any supposed duty and no tort recovery, but he urges this Court to 
explain that its decision in Hale was not intended to reach beyond the 
premises liability context in which it was decided, or to close the door to 
potential recovery by other classes of tort plaintiffs; and to make it clear that 
motorists owe a duty to all, including public safety officers, who are 
foreseeably (as a matter for the trier of fact to determine) injured as proximate 
results of motorists' negligence. 
Similarly, this Court should clarify that a long-established aspect of Utah 
proximate causation law has not been changed by the Court of Appeals 
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opinion. At ffif 23 through 27, and n. 3, of its opinion, the Court of Appeals 
strains to make this case fit under the same analytical framework as Steiner 
Corp. v. Johnson & Hiqqins of California. 2000 UT 21. 996 P.2d 531. ln1J26, 
the Court of Appeals states: 
The Steiner II court concluded that the element of causation could not 
be established where the negligence of the plaintiff occurred before the 
professional was engaged: 
[W]e conclude that a pre-existing condition that a professional is 
called upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either proximate or 
direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an appropriate 
standard of care in fulfilling his duties. To avoid otherwise would 
allow professionals to avoid responsibility for the very duties they 
undertake to perform. A doctor, for example, might be able to 
avoid liability for negligently treating an injured person because 
the patient negligently had run a traffic light and was injured. 
Such a result would be clearly unsound. 
(Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals then remarkably, sua sponte 
(Mr. Oldroyd made no such argument), proceeded to state, in paragraph 27 of 
its opinion: 
Because the acts of Steiner [the plaintiff[ preceded the engagement of J 
& H [the professional], the Steiner II court [this Court] held that it did not 
relate to the injury.... Without such a causal connection the plaintiffs 
prior negligence could not be considered under Utah's comparative fault 
analysis.... The causation element here is also affected by the 
sequence of events. While it is true that "but for" Oldroyd's accident 
Fordham would not have been present at the scene, the direct cause of 
his injuries was a separate and subsequent act of a third party. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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That observation appears to be clearly at odds with the rule laid down by 
this Court in Godeskv v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984), a case 
cited by Mr. Fordham in his opening Court of Appeals Brief: 
An intervening negligent act does not automatically become a 
superseding cause that relieves the earlier actor of liability. The earlier 
actor is charged with the foreseeable negligent acts of others. 
Therefore, if the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier 
negligent act is a concurring [not superseding] cause. 
Id. at 545. 
The Court of Appeals seems to have been reaching, and in that exercise 
reached for Steiner, a case that is analytically decidedly different from this one 
and that deals, unlike this one, with the very raison d'etre for the involvement 
of professionals in the affairs of plaintiffs. Left standing, the Court of Appeals 
opinion might well cause trial judges erroneously, even in the face of the 
established proposition that it is only unforeseeable acts that break the chain 
of causation,4 summarily to dismiss claims of tort plaintiffs. This Court should 
recognize that possibility and explain that the causation analysis of the Court 
of Appeals opinion is erroneous. 
4
 As explained above (see Facts 7-14, pp. 7-8 above), Mr. Oldroyd has 
through his deposition testimony himself essentially acknowledged the 
foreseeability aspect of Mr. Fordham's proximate causation contention. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The professional rescuer doctrine is at odds with the principle at the 
heart of Utah tort law that each tortfeasor should bear his, her, or its fair share 
of responsibility, as determined by a jury, for damages his, her, or its 
negligence has proximately caused another to sustain. Also, adoption of that 
doctrine by this Court would amount to unfair discrimination against Utah 
public safety officers, for the doctrine does not apply to private persons and it 
does not apply to other public employees. Nor do the various reasons offered 
in support of the doctrine appear to hold water. Assumption of the risk is not 
an absolute defense but should be viewed under the umbrella of comparative 
fault. The fact that Mr. Fordham, like other public safety officers injured in the 
course of their job duties, is paid by the taxpayers and the fact that he has 
received workers compensation benefits have no pertinent legal significance. 
Furthermore, the doctrine's prohibition of claims against those whose 
negligence causes peace officers to be at scenes where they are injured but 
non-prohibition of claims against those whose negligence more directly causes 
injury is illustrative of its logical weakness. 
This Court should rule (for reasons such as those articulated by the 
courts in Minnich (p. 11 above), Christensen (pp. 16-17), and Banvai (p. 18), 
that there is no need or good public policy reason for any aspect of the 
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professional rescuer doctrine to be made part of Utah common law. 
Alternatively, the Court should decline to apply the doctrine to the facts of this 
case and rule (similar to the holdings of the Lave and Levandoski cases 
discussed at pp. 19-20, above) that Mr. Fordham may proceed with his claim 
against Mr. Oldroyd. 
This Court should, in any event, reverse the Court of Appeals opinion 
and the Summary Judgment so that this case may proceed to trial and so that 
the jury may decide questions that jurors typically decide in personal injury 
negligence actions (including, if Mr. Oldroyd cares to pursue such a 
contention, and if there is sufficient evidence to support such a contention, 
Mr. Fordham's own supposed negligence in doing what he was doing). 
This Court should also, in the course of addressing the Court of 
Appeals' duty and causation analyses, explain that Hale should not be 
extended beyond its premises liability context; that the rule of Godeskv is still 
alive and well; and that the pertinent rule of Steiner is limited to the concept it 
discusses: that professionals should not be able to lay fault off on those who 
hire them for those persons' own antecedent negligence. 
Regarding the specific issue concerning which the Court granted 
certiorari: this Court should determine (1) that the Court of Appeals did not 
correctly adopt the professional rescuer doctrine; (2) that the Court of Appeals 
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did not correctly delineate the rationales supporting that doctrine (if its 
discussion of "The Element of Duty" and "The Element of Causation" 
constitutes such delineation); and (3) that the Court of Appeals did not 
correctly delineate the scope of application of that doctrine (assuming that the 
doctrine is ever to be applied by the courts of this State and if the Court of 
Appeals' application of the doctrine to Mr. Fordham's situation -- as opposed to 
situations to which the doctrine traces its origins and/or situations in which the 
alleged tortfeasor is the one who calls for help -- is what this Court had in mind 
with respect to that part of its grant of certiorari). 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^ d a y of June, 2006. 
PETER C.COLLINS 
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Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Court finds that 
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McHUGH, Judge: 
\l Richard G, Fordham appeals the trial courtrs grant of Ryan 
Oldroyd's motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 "When reviewing a district court's grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
here, the plaintiff. We recite the facts of this case 
accordingly." Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 
25, ^ |3, 116 P. 3d 271 (quotations and citation omitted). 
%3 On December 28, 2003, Oldroyd was involved in a single-car 
accident on a freeway off-ramp in Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
accident was the result of Oldroyd*s alleged negligent operation 
of his vehicle when he encountered snowy and/or icy road 
conditions on the freeway. 
K4 Several Utah Highway Patrol troopers, including Fordham, 
responded to Oldroyd1s accident. When Fordham arrived at the 
scene, he positioned and stopped his vehicle for purposes of 
traffic control and highway safety. Fordham then walked to the 
rear of his vehicle to retrieve flares, which he intended to use 
to warn approaching drivers of the accident. While Fordham was 
retrieving the flares from the trunk of his vehicle, an 
approaching driver lost control of her automobile, allegedly in a 
negligent manner, when she encountered snowy and/or icy road 
conditions on the freeway, and struck Fordham. As a result, 
Fordham sustained substantial bodily injuries. 
15 In May 2004, Fordham initiated this action against Oldroyd, 
asserting that Oldroyd's alleged negligence was the proximate 
cause of his injuries and seeking to recover damages.1 After 
limited discovery, Oldroyd filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that the "fireman's rule"2 precludes Fordham's negligence 
claim against Oldroyd. After oral argument, the trial court 
granted Oldroyd's motion. Fordham appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%6 Fordham asserts that the trial court erred by granting 
Oldroyd's motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion 
that the professional-rescuer doctrine precludes Fordham's 
negligence claim against Oldroyd. Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Because 
summary judgment presents only questions of law, we give no 
deference to the district court's legal decisions and review them 
for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 
85,HlO, 100 P.3d 1200. 
1Prior to filing this action against Oldroyd, Fordham 
settled with the driver of the vehicle that struck him for her 
insurance policy limits of $50,000. In addition, Fordham was 
eligible for, and has received, workers' compensation benefits. 
2Although we prefer to refer to this doctrine as the 
"professional-rescuer doctrine," other jurisdictions have used 
numerous terms to describe it, including the "fireman's rule," 
the "firefighter's rule," and the "public safety officer's rule." 
Accordingly, in this opinion, we may refer to the doctrine by any 
of the aforementioned terms, particularly when discussing the 
approaches taken by other jurisdictions. 
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ANALYSIS 
if"7 In challenging the trial court's grant of Oldroyd's motion 
for summary judgment, Fordham does not contend that there is a 
"genuine issue as to any material fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Rather, Fordham argues that the trial court erred by ruling that 
Oldroyd was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," id. , 
based upon its conclusion that the professional-rescuer doctrine 
bars Fordham's negligence claim against Oldroyd. 
I. The Professional-Rescuer Doctrine 
1f8 This case presents the first opportunity for any Utah 
appellate court to consider whether, under Utah law, the 
professional-rescuer doctrine operates to bar a police officer's 
claim for injuries against a driver, whose alleged negligence 
caused the officer to be at the scene of an accident, but where 
the officer's injuries were inflicted by the alleged negligence 
of a third party. This case presents a difficult issue with 
cogent arguments supporting both the rejection and the adoption 
of the rule in this state. After carefully considering this 
issue, we agree with the trial court that, as matter of public 
policy and as limited to the facts of this case, Utah should join 
the majority of states that have adopted the professional-rescuer 
doctrine. 
f9 Under the professional-rescuer doctrine, "a professional 
rescuer ordinarily cannot recover damages for injuries sustained, 
while responding to an emergency, from the person who negligently 
created the crisis." 25 Vincent Robert Johnson, Personal Injury, 
Rescuers and the Duty to Act § 1.07[1] (Louis R. Frumer & Melvin 
I. Friedman eds., 2004) (footnotes omitted); see also 57B Am. 
Jur. 2d Negligence § 782 (2004). 
flO For over a century, this rule has been adopted by the vast 
majority of jurisdictions that have considered it. The Alaska 
Supreme Court recently noted: "Nearly all of the courts that 
have considered whether or not to adopt the [f]irefighter's 
[r]ule have in fact adopted it." Moody v. Delta W., Inc., 3 8 
P.3d 1139, 1140-41 (Alaska 2002) (stating that at the time the 
decision was issued, only one state had rejected the rule, while 
the overwhelming majority of states that had considered the rule 
had adopted it, but also noting that the rule had been abolished 
or limited by statute in several states). "The broad, albeit not 
unanimous, endorsement by the courts of the fireman's [rule] 
suggests that the rule is sound." Johnson, supra, § 1.07[2] 
(footnote omitted); see also 8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway 
Traffic § 691 (1997) (noting that the fireman's rule is "widely 
recognized"). Although it "has been criticized by some authors 
and judges, it is undeniably true . . . that almost all 
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jurisdictions confronting this issue have adopted some form of 
the fireman's rule." Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 643-44 
(Iowa 1984) (citations omitted). 
Kll Notwithstanding its broad acceptance by courts that have 
considered it, the professional-rescuer doctrine has been 
rejected by some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Christensen v. 
Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Or. 1984) (abolishing doctrine on 
grounds that supporting policy arguments were flawed and Oregon 
had abolished assumption of risk by passing comparative 
negligence statute); Minnich v. Med-Waste, Inc., 564 S.E.2d 98, 
103 (S.C. 2002) (declining to adopt doctrine because the court 
was "not persuaded by any of the various rationales advanced by 
those courts that recognize the firefighter's rule"). In 
addition, its application has been limited by other courts. See, 
e.g., Levandoski v. Cone, 841 A.2d 208, 216 (Conn. 2004) 
(refusing to extend doctrine beyond premises liability); Court v. 
Grzelinski, 379 N.E.2d 281, 285 (111. 1978) (same); Lave v. 
Neumann, 317 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Neb. 1982) (refusing to extend 
doctrine to police officer on public property). 
1(12 Fordham argues that the rule unfairly discriminates against 
police officers and firefighters, while other public employees 
are free to sue any persons that might have contributed to an 
injury inflicted upon those employees during the performance of 
their duties. The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted similar 
reasoning in rejecting the professional-rescuer doctrine in 
Minnich: 
In our view, the tort law of this state 
adequately addresses negligence claims 
brought against non-employer tortfeasors 
arising out of injuries incurred by 
firefighters and police officers during the 
discharge of their duties. We are not 
persuaded by any of the various rationales 
advanced by those courts that recognize the 
firefighter's rule. The more sound public 
policy—and the one we adopt — is to decline 
to promulgate a rule singling out police 
officers and firefighters for discriminatory 
treatment. 
564 S.E.2d at 103. 
fl3 Although it is a close question and Fordham raises valid 
considerations, we are persuaded that public policy weighs in 
favor of adopting the professional-rescuer doctrine in Utah. 
Furthermore, we believe that application of the rule is 
consistent with the existing tort law of this state. 
20050325-CA 4 
II. Rationale for the Professional-Rescuer Doctrine 
Ul4 The historic underpinnings of the doctrine can be found in 
decisions addressing traditional concepts of premises liability. 
"Since a policeman or fireman was privileged to enter land 
pursuant to his public duties and could come on property any 
place or time, courts classified them as bare licensees and held 
the only duty owed these public servants was to not wantonly or 
willfully injure them." Pottebaum, 347 N.W.2d at 644; see also 
Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Co., 894 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Ark. 1995) 
(adopting doctrine and recognizing licensee origin); Walters v. 
Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 611 (Cal. 1977) (reaffirming doctrine and 
recognizing licensee origin); Levandoski, 841 A.2d at 216 
(refusing to extend doctrine beyond its historical use in 
premises liability cases); Minnich# 564 S.E.2d at 100 (rejecting 
doctrine and citing Gibson v. Leonard, 32 N.E. 182 (111. 1892), 
as the first case to hold that a firefighter entering private 
property in performance of his job duties is a licensee). 
Although "[s]ome jurisdictions still rely on this rationale to 
limit liability to public safety officials," Pottebaum, 347 
N.W.2d at 644 (citing cases using this rationale), modern 
decisions have based application of the doctrine on a series of 
justifications that are not dependent on the professional 
rescuer's status as a licensee. 
^15 One reason offered for the doctrine is the principle of 
assumption of risk. Courts relying on this rationale "bar 
recovery for damages caused to policemen or firefighters from 
those risks that are inherent in their jobs." Id. at 645 (citing 
cases relying upon assumption of risk); see also Neighbarger v. 
Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 352 (Cal. 1994) (stating that 
doctrine is "an example of the proper application of the 
[principle] of assumption of .risk"); Steelman v. Lind, 634 P.2d 
666t 667 (Nev. 1981) (holding that a highway patrol officer 
"cannot base a tort claim upon damage caused by the very risk 
that he is paid to encounter and with which he is trained to 
cope"). 
1l6 In Levandoski, the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to 
extend the doctrine beyond premises liability cases, in part, on 
the grounds that assumption of risk had been eliminated by the 
Connecticut Legislature's adoption of comparative negligence. 
See 841 A.2d at 214-15; see also Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 
1210, 1216-17 (Or. 1984) (holding that doctrine was not 
sustainable after abolishment of assumption of risk as a defense 
by Oregon Legislature). As in Oregon and Connecticut, assumption 
of risk "is no longer recognized in Utah as a total bar to 
recovery." Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24,1(21, 116 P.3d 263; see 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (2002) . Thus, adoption of the 
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professional-rescuer doctrine in Utah cannot be supported by a 
rationale based upon a theory of assumption of risk. 
Kl7 Assumption of risk, however, is not the only justification 
courts have cited as support for the professional-rescuer 
doctrine. Some jurisdictions have relied in large part on public 
policy considerations. See, e.g., Waggoner. 894 S.W.2d at 915 
(adopting doctrine); Walters. 571 P.2d at 612 (reaffirming 
doctrine and finding it was supported by "public policy" and 
"fundamental concepts of justice"); Thomas v. Pang. 811 P.2d 821, 
825 (Haw. 1991) ("[I]t offends public policy to say that a 
citizen invites private liability merely because he happens to 
create a need for those public services." (alteration in 
original) (quotations and citation omitted)); Pottebaum. 347 
N.W.2d at 645 (citing cases relying on public policy). 
118 In Moody v. Delta Western. Inc.. 38 P.3d 1139 (Alaska 2002), 
the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the professional-rescuer 
doctrine, stating: 
"There is at work here a public policy 
component that strongly opposes the notion 
that an act of ordinary negligence would 
expose the actor to liability for injuries 
sustained in the course of a public servant's 
performance of necessary, albeit hazardous, 
public duties. In absence of a legislative 
expression of contrary policy, a citizen 
should not have to run the risk of a civil 
judgment against him for negligent acts that 
occasion the presence of a firefighter at the 
scene of a carelessly set fire or of a police 
officer at a disturbance or unlawful incident 
resulting from negligent conduct." 
Id. at 1141 (quoting Berko v. Freda. 459 A.2d 663, 667 (N.J. 
1983)). We are persuaded that the doctrine, as applied to the 
facts before us, is consistent with public policy and not 
inconsistent with any legislative pronouncement to the contrary, 
despite Utah's adoption of comparative fault. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-38. 
III. The Element of Duty 
iil9 To recover for negligence, Fordham must establish that: (1) 
Oldroyd owed Fordham a duty of care, (2) Oldroyd breached that 
duty, (3) Oldroyd's breach of the duty was the proximate cause of 
Fordham's injuries, and (4) Fordham actually suffered injuries or 
damage. See Webb v. University of Utah. 2005 UT 80,119, 125 P.3d 
906. Rather than introducing a new concept into tort law, the 
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professional-rescuer doctrine recognizes a failure of an 
essential element of a claim for negligence. The rule bars the 
rescuer's recovery "for the very valid public policy reason that 
the party or parties who negligently started the fire had no 
legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that 
the firefighter was employed to confront." Waggoner, 894 S.W.2d 
at 915 (adopting rule). 
f20 In one of the earliest cases to adopt the professional-
rescuer doctrine, Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court explained the absence of the duty element of negligence, 
stating: 
In terms of duty, it may be said there is 
none owed the fireman to exercise care so as 
not to require the special services for which 
he is trained and paid. Probably most fires 
are attributable to negligence, and in the 
final analysis the policy decision is that it 
would be too burdensome to charge all who 
carelessly cause or fail to prevent fires 
with the injuries suffered by the expert 
retained with public funds to deal with those 
inevitable, although negligently created, 
occurrences. Hence, for that risk, the 
fireman should receive appropriate 
compensation from the public he serves, both 
in pay which reflects the hazard and in 
workmen's compensation benefits for the 
consequences of the inherent risks of the 
calling. 
Krauth v. Geller, 157 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1960); see also Kelly 
v. Ely, 764 A.2d 1031, 1034-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
(reaffirming Krauth after statutory limitation of the rule and 
stating that "[i]n our view, the statute [limiting the rule] was 
intended to . . . afford protection to a firefighter injured as a 
result of negligence unrelated to and independent of, the onset 
of the fire"). We agree with New Jersey's application of the 
rule to bar claims against the party whose alleged negligence 
caused the need for the services of the rescuer, but was not the 
direct cause of the rescuer's injury. 
1f2l Furthermore, narrowly defining the scope of the duty owed is 
consistent with the approach adopted by the Utah Supreme Court 
regarding an analogous issue under the comparative fault statute. 
In Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263, the Utah Supreme 
Court considered whether the "open and obvious" defense to a tort 
action brought against a landowner had survived Utah's adoption 
of comparative fault. See id. at ^7-31. The plaintiff in 
20050325-CA 7 
Beckstead was injured when he fell from a balcony while painting 
a home being built for the defendant. See id. at 1(3. Because 
the home was still under construction, the railing on the balcony 
had not yet been installed. See id. The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that 
the danger was open and obvious, completely barring the 
plaintiff's recovery. See id. at f 4 . This court affirmed, and 
Hale appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, see id. at fi|5-6, on the 
ground that the application of the open and obvious doctrine 
"contravened comparative fault principles," id. at Ul2. 
f22 The Utah Supreme Court agreed that the Utah Legislature "has 
necessarily disavowed any tort theory of recovery inconsistent 
with comparative fault apportionment principles," including the 
doctrine of assumption of risk. Id. at 1(21. Nevertheless, the 
court determined that the Restatement (Second) of Torts version 
of the open and obvious doctrine was still relevant to the issue 
of the scope of the duty owed. See id. at }^23 (stating that the 
open and obvious rule "is a duty-defining rule that simply states 
that, under appropriate circumstances, a landowner's duty of care 
might not include warning or otherwise protecting visitors from 
obvious dangers"). Acknowledging that there is a subtle 
distinction between excusing negligence upon a defense of 
assumption of risk and narrowly defining the duty of care so that 
the conduct is not negligent, the court explained the importance 
of that difference: "Where there is no duty, there is no fault 
to compare or distribute under the comparative fault scheme." 
Id. at H24. Thus, the Hale court affirmed the application of the 
open and obvious doctrine to define the scope of the duty owed by 
the defendant to the plaintiff, but reversed and remanded the 
entry of summary judgment because of disputed material facts. 
See id. at ^[39-40. We believe a narrow scope of duty is also 
appropriate here, and that the doctrine of assumption of risk is 
a duty-defining rule under the facts of this case. 
IV. The Element of Causation 
f2 3 The Utah Supreme Court undertook a similar analysis to 
define the limits of contributory negligence in comparing fault 
among tortfeasors in Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of 
California, 2000 UT 21, 996 P.2d 531 (Steiner II). In that case, 
however, the court focused on the absence of the element of 
causation. See id. at ^7. Steiner Corporation (Steiner) brought 
a professional malpractice action against Johnson & Higgins of 
California (J&H), claiming that J&H had negligently structured 
the Steiner employee retirement plan. See id. at 1|2 . Steiner 
established a plan that allowed retiring employees to choose 
between one lump sum payment or the payment of a fixed amount per 
month. See Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Cal., 135 F.3d 
684, 686 (10th Cir. 1998) (Steiner I) (providing, as noted by the 
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Steiner II court, a more complete statement of the facts of the 
case). The formula developed by Steiner to calculate the lump 
sum payment resulted in that option being more valuable than the 
monthly payments. See id. As a result, most retirees selected 
the lump sum option. See id. 
f24 Subsequently, Steiner retained J&H as the actuary for the 
plan. See id. Although more employees opted for the lump sum 
payment at retirement, J&H calculated the valuation of the plan 
each year on the assumption that retirees would choose the 
monthly payment option. See id. In the mid-1980s, Congress 
passed new legislation that required the plan to be amended by a 
specific deadline so that it contained ,!a single formula for 
calculating optional benefits." Id. (quotations and citation 
omitted). Although Steiner asked repeatedly for a comparison of 
the accrued benefits based on the lump sum and monthly payment 
options, J&H never provided that information. See id. at 686-87. 
Instead, J&H amended the plan documents by incorporating the old 
formula for lump sum payments. See id. at 687. Upon learning of 
the significant difference between the two calculation methods 
after the statutory deadline, Steiner further amended the plan to 
substitute a lump sum formula equivalent to the alternative 
monthly distribution. See id. The delay in making the change, 
however, resulted in substantial losses to Steiner because the 
revised formula could only be applied to prospective calculations 
of benefits. See id. 
f25 Steiner sued J&H in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah for professional malpractice, and J&H asserted a 
defense that Steinerfs own negligence was the cause of its 
injury. See id. at 685. The United States District Court for 
the District of Utah certified two questions to the Utah Supreme 
Court: 
(1) whether, under Utah law, the negligent 
acts of a plaintiff in causing or 
contributing to the situation that the 
plaintiff hired a professional to resolve can 
be the basis for a comparative or 
contributory negligence defense, and (2) 
whether, under Utah law, a plaintiff's 
negligent acts in causing or contributing to 
the situation the plaintiff hired a 
professional to resolve can be considered in 
determining causation and damages. 
Steiner II, 2000 UT 21 at |^l. The Utah Supreme Court "answer[ed] 
both questions 'no.'" Id. In reaching that conclusion, the 
Steiner II court distinguished between a client's original act of 
negligence that required it to hire a professional and that 
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client's subsequent negligence that actually interfered with the 
professional's performance of its duties. See id. at f6 ("[A] 
plaintiff's negligence in injuring himself could not be 
contributory negligence because it was not simultaneous[] with or 
co-operating with the fault for which the plaintiff sought 
recovery." (final alteration in original) (quotations and 
citation omitted)). Although the issue was considered in the 
context of contributory negligence, it provides some guidance to 
the question before us. 
H26 The Steiner II court concluded that the element of causation 
could not be established where the negligence of the plaintiff 
occurred before the professional was engaged: 
[W]e conclude that a preexisting condition 
that a professional is called upon to resolve 
cannot be the cause, either proximate or 
direct, of the professional's failure to 
exercise an appropriate standard of care in 
fulfilling his duties. To decide otherwise 
would allow professionals to avoid 
responsibility for the very duties they 
undertake to perform. A doctor, for example, 
might be able to avoid liability for 
negligently treating an injured person 
because the patient negligently had run a 
traffic light and was injured. Such a result 
would be clearly unsound. 
Id. at 17.3 
1(27 Because the acts of Steiner preceded the engagement of J&H, 
the Steiner II court held that it did not relate to the injury. 
See id. at Ull. Without such a causal connection, the 
plaintiff's prior negligence could not be considered under Utah's 
comparative fault analysis. See id. at ^12-14. The causation 
element here is also affected by the sequence of events. While 
it is true that "but for" Oldroyd's accident Fordham would not 
3We are cognizant of the difference between the blameless 
officer here and the defendant in Steiner II that was defending 
against a claim of professional malpractice. The rationale for 
preventing a professional from asserting a contributory 
negligence claim on the basis of the negligence that created the 
circumstances which necessitated the professional's engagement is 
admittedly more compelling. The focus on the timing of acts of 
negligence for purposes of evaluating the causation element of 
negligence, however, is instructive. 
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have been present at the scene, the direct cause of his injuries 
was the separate and subsequent act of a third party. 
1J28 Fordham has already recovered from the driver who actually 
struck him. Thus, we are faced solely with the question of 
whether members of the public have a duty not to require, as the 
result of negligence, highway assistance from police officers. 
In Berko v. Freda, 459 A.2d 663 (N.J. 1983), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court explained that police officers and firefighters 
have a unique role: 
Governmental entities maintain police and 
fire departments in anticipation of those 
inevitable physical perils that burden the 
human condition, whereas most public 
employment posts are created not to confront 
dangers that will arise but to perform some 
other public function that may incidentally 
involve risk. . . . 
This fundamental concept rests on the 
assumption that governmental entities employ 
firefighters and police officers, at least in 
part, to deal with the hazards that may 
result from their taxpayers' own future acts 
of negligence. Exposing the negligent 
taxpayer to liability for having summoned the 
police would impose upon him multiple burdens 
for that protection. 
Id. at 666 (citations omitted); see also Moody v. Delta W., Inc., 
38 P.3d 1139, 1141 (Alaska 2002); Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 
642, 645 (Iowa 1984); Gould v. George Brox, Inc., 623 A.2d 1325, 
1328-29 (N.H. 1993) . 
i[2 9 We agree that police officers are employed for the very 
purpose of responding to emergency situations and that it would 
be contrary to concepts of public policy to impose a duty on 
citizens not to need such services. In addition, "because 
negligence is at the root of many calls for public safety 
officers, allowing recovery would compound the growth of 
litigation," Moody, 38 P.3d at 1142, which we believe is also 
against public policy. We do not believe it would be desirable 
for a police officer struck by a drunk driver while issuing a 
speeding ticket to be able to pursue an action against the 
speeder simply because he is not made whole by the recovery from 
the intoxicated driver. 
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1f30 Although Oldroyd's accident brought Fordham to the scene, it 
was the impact from the third-party vehicle that was the direct 
cause of Fordham's injuries. See Gould, 623 A.2d at 1328 ("The 
plaintiff responded to the scene to control traffic and was not 
injured while responding in his professional capacity to the very 
type of situation for which he was paid and trained to cope, but 
rather by the subsequent and independent negligence of [a third 
party]." (quotations and citation omitted))/ Berko, 459 A.2d at 
665 ("Case law draws a distinction between injuries stemming from 
the negligence that brought the firefighters or police to the 
scene in the first place and injuries suffered from independent 
causes that may follow."). "Thus[,] a police officer who while 
placing a ticket on an illegally parked car is struck by a 
speeding vehicle may maintain action against the speeder but the 
rule bars recovery against the owner of the parked car for 
negligent parking." Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 611 n.2 
(Cal. 1977) . 
i[31 In reaching the conclusion that the professional-rescuer 
doctrine bars Fordham's claim against Oldroyd, we emphasize the 
doctrine's narrowness; it "bars only recovery for the negligence 
that creates the need for the public safety officer's service." 
Moody, 38 P.3d at 1141. Therefore, the professional-rescuer 
doctrine "does not apply to negligent conduct occurring after the 
police officer or firefighter arrives at the scene or to 
misconduct other than that which necessitates the officer's 
presence." Id.; see also 8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway 
Traffic § 691 (1997) (" [T]he fireman's rule is not a bar to a 
police officer's claim for injuries sustained in the course of 
his response to an accident scene where such injuries are the 
result of independent acts of negligence which have no connection 
with the cause of the officer's presence at the scene."); 6 
Personal Injury, Buildings, Business Establishments & Private 
Property § 1.10 [1] [a] (Jerome Nates et al. eds., 2004) ("Most 
courts consider that the fireman's rule is of limited scope. 
That is, while they view the rule as barring recovery for the 
negligent act which caused public officers to be present in their 
official capacity, they permit recovery for any unrelated acts of 
negligence." (footnote omitted)). 
^32 As in the cases cited above, Fordham seeks to recover from 
Oldroyd simply because Oldroyd's prior act of alleged negligence 
brought Fordham to the location where he was struck by a third 
party. We hold that public policy supports a bright-line rule 
barring such actions, and therefore, we adopt the professional-
rescuer doctrine under the facts of this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
K33 In circumstances like those present here, where a police 
officer called to the scene of an accident is injured by a third 
party, the professional-rescuer doctrine bars a claim by that 
officer against the person whose negligence resulted in the 
officer's presence at the scene. We affirm the trial court's 
grant of Oldroyd's motion for summary judgement. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
H34 WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
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